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Abstract
Image compression-based approaches for defending
against the adversarial-example attacks, which threaten the
safety use of deep neural networks (DNN), have been in-
vestigated recently. However, prior works mainly rely on
directly tuning parameters like compression rate, to blindly
reduce image features, thereby lacking guarantee on both
defense efficiency (i.e. accuracy of polluted images) and
classification accuracy of benign images, after applying de-
fense methods. To overcome these limitations, we propose
a JPEG-based defensive compression framework, namely
“feature distillation”, to effectively rectify adversarial ex-
amples without impacting classification accuracy on benign
data. Our framework significantly escalates the defense
efficiency with marginal accuracy reduction using a two-
step method: First, we maximize malicious features filtering
of adversarial input perturbations by developing defensive
quantization in frequency domain of JPEG compression or
decompression, guided by a semi-analytical method; Sec-
ond, we suppress the distortions of benign features to re-
store classification accuracy through a DNN-oriented quan-
tization refine process. Our experimental results show that
proposed “feature distillation” can significantly surpass the
latest input-transformation based mitigations such as Quilt-
ing and TV Minimization in three aspects, including defense
efficiency (improve classification accuracy from ∼ 20% to
∼ 90% on adversarial examples), accuracy of benign im-
ages after defense (≤ 1% accuracy degradation), and pro-
cessing time per image (∼ 259× Speedup). Moreover, our
solution can also provide the best defense efficiency (∼ 60%
accuracy) against the recent adaptive attack with least ac-
curacy reduction (∼ 1%) on benign images when compared
with other input-transformation based defense methods.
1. Introduction
Recent studies have shown that DNN models are inher-
ently vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs) [10, 24],
i.e. malicious inputs crafted by adding small and human-
imperceptible perturbations to normal inputs, strongly fool-
ing the cognitive function of DNNs. For example, in image
recognition, adversarially manipulating the perceptual sys-
tems of autonomous vehicles by physically captured adver-
sarial images, i.e. via camera or sensor [17, 22], can lead to
the misreading on road signs, thus causing potential disas-
trous consequences in DNN-based cyber-physical systems.
Many countermeasures [15, 14, 20, 23, 25, 2] have been
proposed to enhance the robustness of DNNs against ad-
versarial examples, mainly including DNN model-specific
hardening strategies and model-agnostic defenses [11].
Typical model-specific solutions like “adversarial training”
or “defensive distillation” may rectify the model parame-
ters to mitigate the attacks by using the iterative retrain-
ing procedure or masking adversarial gradient. The model-
agnostic approaches such as input dimensionality reduc-
tion [5, 26] or direct JPEG compression [9, 7, 11] attempt
to remove adversarial perturbations from the inputs, before
feeding them into DNN classifiers.
In this work, we focus on improving the effectiveness
and efficiency of compression based model-agnostic mitiga-
tion against adversarial examples. Though standard JPEG
compression has been explored to mitigate the adversarial
examples [9, 7], it can neither effectively remove the ad-
versarial perturbations, nor guarantee the classification ac-
curacy on benign images, due to its focus on human visual
quality. Instead, we propose the DNN-favorable JPEG com-
pression, namely “feature distillation”, by redesigning the
standard JPEG compression algorithm, in order to maxi-
mize the defense efficiency while assuring the DNN testing
accuracy. In specific, 1) We reveal the root reason to limit
the JPEG defense efficiency by analyzing the frequency fea-
ture distributions of adversarial input perturbations during
JPEG compression; 2) Inspired by our observation, we pro-
pose a semi-analytical method to guide the defensive quan-
tization process to maximize the effectiveness of filtering
adversarial features; 3) We characterize the importance of
input features for DNNs by leveraging the statistical fre-
quency component analysis within JPEG, and then develop
DNN-oriented quantization method to recover the degraded
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Figure 1: (a) Testing accuracy v.s. attack success rate at different QFs of JPEG; (b) Statistical information of FGSM-based AE
perturbations in frequency domain (FC denotes frequency component)
accuracy (i.e., a side-effect induced by the feature loss in
perturbation removal) on benign samples.
Our proposed method is built upon the light modifica-
tions of widely adopted JPEG compression and does not
require any expensive model retraining or multiple model
predictions. Evaluations show that “feature distillation”
offers significantly improved effectiveness against a vari-
ety of mainstream adversarial examples (i.e., > 90% accu-
racy on AEs), with very marginal accuracy reduction (i.e.,
≤ 1%) on benign data. Besides, it well beats recent pro-
posed image transformation based defense like Quilting and
TV Minimization in terms of defense efficiency, accuracy
and processing speed. Furthermore, our solution offers the
best defense efficiency (∼ 60%) with lowest accuracy loss
(≤ 1%) against the recent adaptive attack–Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [3] among existing
input-transformation based defenses, though it is not com-
pletely immune to such attack. To our best knowledge, there
is no published work that can completely mitigate BPDA,
since it is very challenging for defense if attackers can it-
eratively strengthen the adversarial examples according to
the defense. However, we believe our work provides a new
angle to redesign input-based defense to well balance the
accuracy of benign data and defense efficiency with DNN-
oriented/defensive quantization. It is a new trial towards
developing better input-transformation based defenses.
2. Background, Related Work and Motivation
2.1. Basics of Adversarial Examples and JPEG
Adversarial examples: (X∗ = X + δX ) are created
to fool the DNNs (Y ∗ 6= Y ) with imperceptible pertur-
bations: argminδX ‖ δX ‖ s.t. F (Θ) (X + δX) = Y ∗,
which can be solved through many crafting algorithms: 1)
FGSM [10] (fast gradient sign method) is a L∞ attack and
utilizes the gradient of the loss function to determine the
direction to modify all the input pixels. It is designed to
be fast, rather than optimal; 2) BIM [13] (basic iterative
gradient sign method) is the iterative version of FGSM by
gradually adding small perturbations α (L∞) until reach-
ing the upper bound  or achieving successful attack; 3)
Deepfool [16] uses geometrical knowledge to search the
minimal perturbations (L2) by assuming DNN as a lin-
ear classifier and each class is separated by a hyper-plane.
Such an approach finds the nearest hyper-plane from X
and uses geometrical knowledge to calculate the projec-
tion distance; 4) C&W [6] (Carlini & Wagner method)
are a series of L0, L2, and L∞ attacks that achieve 100%
attack success rate with much lower distortions compar-
ing with the above-mentioned attacks. In particular, the
C&W L2 attack uses a more effective objective function
f(x) = max (max {Z(X)i i 6= t} − Z(X)t,−κ) with
logits Z(X)i and adjustable parameter κ. Further, C&W
L0 and L∞ attacks are implemented indirectly by itera-
tively calling their L2 attack. 5) BPDA [3] is the lat-
est adaptive attack by recurrently computing the adversar-
ial gradient after applying defense: x∗ = clip(x +  ·
sgn(OxJθ,Y (DEF (x)))), where J represents the function
of an DNN model and DEF is the applied defense method
in BPDA attack. It is state-of-the-art of attack by assuming
adversaries know the defense method.
JPEG: [27] is a popular lossy compression standard for
digital images based on the fact that Human-Visual System
(HVS) is less sensitive to the high frequency components
than low frequency ones [31]. A typical JPEG compression
mainly consists of image partitioning, discrete cosine trans-
formation (DCT), quantization, zig-zag reordering and en-
tropy coding, etc. [27]. To compress a raw image, the high
(low) frequency DCT coefficients are usually scaled more
(less) and then rounded to nearest integers by performing
element-wise division based on a predefined 8 × 8 Quanti-
zation Table (Q-Table) [27]. The trade-off between image
quality and compression rate is realized by scaling each el-
ement in Q-Table via the “Quantization Factor” (QF) [30].
A higher compression rate corresponds to a lower QF. A
reverse procedure of above steps can decompress an image.
2.2. Related Works
Applying JPEG compression to mitigate adversarial ex-
amples has been discussed in prior work. Kurakin et al. [13]
test some model-agnostic approaches on adversarial ex-
amples and reveal a good potential of JPEG compression
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Figure 2: Illustration of two different modes of “feature distillation”–one pass and two pass.
for defending adversarial attacks. Dziugaite et al. [9] em-
pirically report JPEG compression can reverse only small
adversarial perturbations, but the reason behind is uncer-
tain. Guo et al. [11] test JPEG compression, image Quilt-
ing (piecing together small patches from a database of im-
age patches), total variance minimization (combining pixel
dropout with total variation minimization), etc. against
the gray-box and black-box adversarial attacks, and report
Quilting and TVM show better efficiency than JPEG. Ay-
demir et al. [4] compare the effects of JPEG compression
and JPEG2000, against adversarial perturbations. Though
JPEG2000 shows better performance than JPEG, the ef-
ficiency is still far from satisfactory. Xu et al. [29] pro-
pose an ensemble method, namely “feature squeezing”,
to defeat the adversarial examples by integrating differ-
ent types of “squeezers” (i.e. model-agnostic processing).
Das et al. [7] propose a JPEG compression based ensem-
ble method, namely “vaccinating”, to mitigate adversarial
attacks by voting the result based on a variety of compres-
sion rates. Prakash et al. [18] develop “pixel deflection”
and “adaptive soft-thresholding” approaches by replacing
or smoothing adversary perturbations. This method shows
good defense efficiency on gray box-setting without eval-
uating adaptive attacks. Xie. et al. [28] propose two ran-
domization operations–random size and random padding,
against adversary examples. In summary, prior studies
empirically test the JPEG compression by directly tuning
the compression rate, without digging into the underly-
ing image processing mechanisms. The conclusion is that
JPEG suffers from very limited defense efficiency but in-
evitable DNN accuracy degradation. To overcome those
issues, standard JPEG compression should be integrated
with the costly ensemble solutions. On the other side, our
work directly targets the fundamental entities of JPEG com-
pression/decompression, like defensive and DNN-oriented
quantizations, to unleash its defense potentials with almost
zero loss of DNN testing accuracy, thus is low-cost.
2.3. Why standard JPEG is not good?
DNN suffers from both low testing accuracy and weak
defense efficiency against adversarial examples if we di-
rectly employ standard JPEG compression based on human-
visual system (HVS). To explore how existing compres-
sion can impact DNN’s testing accuracy, we trained a Mo-
bileNet [12] with high quality JPEG images (QF=100, Im-
ageNet), and tested it with both clear images and FGSM-
based adversarial examples at various QFs (i.e., QF=100,
90, 75, 50). As Fig. 1 (a) shows, the testing accuracy de-
grades significantly as the compression rate increases (or
QF from 100 to 50), despite the slightly improved defense
efficiency (or drop in attack success rate). To achieve the
best defense efficiency among our selected four QFs (attack
success rate = 0.62 at QF = 50), the accuracy is even reduced
by ∼ 8% on benign images than that of the original one
(QF=100). Apparently, the HVS-based JPEG compression
is not an ideal solution in terms of defense efficiency and
accuracy. Fig. 1 (b) further shows the means and standard
deviations of DCT coefficients of malicious distortions at
all 64 frequency bands. Given that malicious perturbations
are almost randomly distributed in every frequency band,
HVS-based JPEG compression, which distorts more (less)
on high (low) frequency components of the input, is un-
likely to effectively filter the distortions across the whole
spectral domain.
3. Our Approach–Feature Distillation
In this section, we first provide a detailed analysis on
how to wisely redesign the quantization process in JPEG
compression to minimize attack success rate. As this lossy
compression will still reduce the classification accuracy (see
Fig. 1), we then develop the DNN-oriented quantization
refine method, to compensate the reduced accuracy of be-
nign images. Based on how/where the derived quantiza-
tion will be placed in JPEG, our framework supports two
modes (see Fig. 2): 1) One pass process by inserting a
new quantization/de-quantization only in the decompres-
sion of standard JPEG; 2) Two pass process by also re-
placing the quantization of compression, followed by one
pass process. The two pass method provides an opportu-
nity to directly embed crafted quantization at sensor side
to compress raw data to further improve defense efficiency,
given that JPEG-based image compression, an integrated
component in sensors, is usually a “must-have” step to save
data storage/transfer cost in real applications. Therefore, the
one-pass handles incoming images compressed by standard
JPEG before sending them to DNNs, while the two-pass tar-
gets raw data directly sampled by devices like image sen-
sors. The target is to address both attack efficiency and test
accuracy simultaneously.
3.1. Step 1: Defensive Quantization for Enhancing
Defense Efficiency
We propose to use spectral filter by leveraging quantiza-
tion process in JPEG on DNN inputs (i.e., adversarial ex-
amples), in order to mitigate adversarial perturbations.
One pass process. The idea is to directly filter out the
malicious perturbations in frequency domain through the
quantization process. As Fig. 2 shows, the JPEG-formatted
input will be decompressed and then feed into the DNNs as
the raw data at the beginning. By taking this chance, we
insert a new pair of quantization/dequantization processes
after the dequantization of standard JPEG decompression to
purify the potential adversarial perturbations. Note we omit
the first dequantization in the following analysis ideally by
assuming it can almost preserve all frequency features of
the input. Assuming for each 8×8 block in the input image
X , adversarial distortion δX is added to X with intensity
. The DCT transformation–a linear operation, essentially
projects the image from spatial domain to spectral domain.
Therefore, the original input and adversarial perturbations
could be linearly separated as:
DCT (X+ δX) = DCT (X)+DCT (δX) = CX ·B+CδX ·B (1)
where CX and CδX are the DCT coefficients of X and δX ,
respectively, for the 8 × 8 image block, and B is the DCT
transformation basis. The maximum magnitude of CδX can
be calculated by the summation of all 64 frequency compo-
nents and each term is bounded by cos(θ) · . Thus we have
−8 ·  < CδX < 8 · . The DCT coefficients will be quan-
tized again in this decompression process, providing a good
opportunity for filtering the perturbations. The quantization
is approximated as:
Round (CX+CδX/QS) ≈ Round (CX/QS)+Round (CδX/QS) (2)
where QS is the defensive quantization step (QS). Ideally,
if QS > |CδX |, then the perturbation CδX can be elimi-
nated. However, this equation may induce undesired round-
ing error to limit the efficiency of removing malicious per-
turbations, given thatCδX is usually much smaller thanCX .
We further analyze such a rounding error by decomposing
CX = η + QS/2, then we have:
Round (CX+CδX/QS) = Round (η+QS/2+CδX/QS) (3)
If QS/2 + CδX > QS, this part will be rounded to
±1,±2,±3..., which will induce a stronger rounding er-
ror than the adversarial perturbations, resulting in degraded
defense efficiency.
Two pass process. To avoid such rounding error, we
further propose two pass method. As Fig. 2 shows, the raw
data (i.e. sampled by sensors) will be compressed through
a defensive quantization process, rather than the standard
JPEG quantization, followed by an entire one pass pro-
cess. Assuming such compressed benign inputs are then
polluted by adversarial perturbations, adversarial examples
will be further processed by considering both compres-
sion/decompression procedures as:
Round
(
(Round
(
η+QS/2
QS
)
∗QS+CδX )/QS
)
= Round(η)
(4)
The malicious perturbations can be appropriately filtered
without inducing any rounding error if QS satisfies the fol-
lowing equation:
Round (CδX/QS) = 0⇒ QS > 2
∣∣CδX ∣∣ , CδX ∈ (−8 < CδX < 8)
(5)
Therefore, we adopt the same QS (QS > 16 ·) to eliminate
the perturbations CδX in both passes.
3.2. Step 2: DNN-Oriented Quantization for Com-
pensating Accuracy Reduction
To recover the testing accuracy (see Section 2.3), our
next step is to develop a DNN-oriented JPEG compression
method by refining the defensive quantization table from
step 1. We analyze the difference between human visual
system (HVS) and DNN on feature extractions, and then
propose a heuristic design flow.
Difference between HVS&DNN on Feature Extrac-
tions. Since the feature loss happens in the frequency do-
main after the DCT process, we first study the problem that
which frequency components have the most significant im-
pact on DNN results. Assume xk is a single pixel of a raw
image X , and xk can be represented by 8× 8 DCT:
xk =
7∑
i=0
7∑
j=0
c(k,i,j) · b(i,j) (6)
where c(k,i,j) and b(i,j) are the DCT coefficient and its basis
function at 64 different frequencies, respectively. It is well
known that the human visual system (HVS) is less sensi-
tive to high frequency components but more sensitive to low
frequency ones. The JPEG quantization table is designed
based on this fundamental understanding. However, DNNs
examine the importance of the frequency information in a
quite different way. The gradient of the DNN function F
with respect to a basis function b(i,j) is calculated as:
∂F/∂b(i,j) = ∂F/∂xk × ∂xk/∂bi,j = ∂F/∂xk × c(k,i,j) (7)
Eq. (7) implies that the contribution of a frequency com-
ponent (bi,j) to the DNN result will be mainly decided by
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Figure 3: An overview of heuristic design flow of DNN-Oriented compression based on crafted quantization.
its associated DCT coefficient (c(k,i,j)) and the importance
of the pixel (∂F/∂xk). Here c(k,i,j) will be distorted by the
quantization before training. Ideally a well trained DNN
model should respond with different strengths to all the
64 frequency components depending on the c(k,i,j) values.
From this observation, large c(k,i,j) should be compressed
less (using a small quantization step) in order to ensure a
desirable classification accuracy.
In contrast, the default quantization table used in JPEG
focuses on compressing more on less sensitive frequency
components to HVS. As a result, in order to defend against
adversarial attacks, aggressive compression is required,
making DNNs easily misclassified if original versions con-
tain important high frequency features. The DNN models
trained with original images learn comprehensive features,
especially high frequency ones. However, such features are
actually lost in more compressed testing images, resulting
in considerable misclassification rate (see Fig. 1(a)).
Therefore, we propose to compensate the accuracy
reduction incurred by defending adversarial examples
through a heuristic design flow (see Fig. 3): 1) character-
ize the importance of each frequency component through
frequency analysis on benign images; 2) lower the quantiza-
tion step of the most sensitive frequency components based
on the statistical information for enhancing accuracy.
A: Frequency Component Analysis. For each input
image, we first characterize the pre-quantized DCT coef-
ficient distribution at each frequency component. Such a
distribution represents the energy contribution of each fre-
quency band [19]. Prior work [19] has proved that the pre-
quantized coefficients can be approximated as normal (or
Laplace) distribution with zero mean but different standard
deviations (δi,j). A larger δi,j means more energy in band
(i, j), hence more important features for DNN learning. As
Fig. 3 shows, each image will be first partitioned into N
8×8 blocks, followed by a block-wise DCT. Then the DCT
coefficient distribution at each frequency component will
be characterized by sorting all coefficients at the same fre-
quency component across all image blocks. The statistical
information, such as the standard deviation δi,j of each co-
efficient, will be calibrated from each individual histogram.
B: Quantization Table Refinement. Once the impor-
tance of frequency components is identified based on the
standard deviations of DCT coefficients (δi,j), the next step
is to boost the accuracy of legitimate examples {accl} (re-
fer to the testing accuracy of benign images processed after
the defense method). Our analysis in Section 2.3 indicates
that a proper selection of QS can effectively mitigate the
perturbations, whereas larger QS will induce more quanti-
zation errors. Therefore, we reduce the quantization errors
of the most sensitive frequency components to enhance the
testing accuracy by lowering their corresponding quantiza-
tion steps within the quantization table, but such frequency
components should be as few as possible to maintain the
defense efficiency. In specific, we first sort the magnitude
of δi,j in an ascending order as δ
′
i,j , then set the appropriate
quantization step based on δ
′
i,j . To simplify our design, we
introduce a discrete mapping function to derive the quanti-
zation step on each frequency band, base on the associated
standard deviation δi,j , i.e., QSi,j = (δi,j ≤ T ? S1 : S2),
where T is the threshold to divide the 64 frequency compo-
nents. Note that S1 > S2. The 64 frequency components
are divided into two bands (see Fig. 3): the red colored Ac-
curacy Sensitive (AS) band with QS = S2, and the blue
colored Malicious Defense (MD) band with QS = S1 from
Section 3.1.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we first explore the parameter optimiza-
tion in our feature distillation under the constraints of high
classification accuracy on malicious inputs after applying
defense, while preserving the accuracy of legitimate ones
given that both types of data can arrive for a realistic DNN
testing. Then we comprehensively evaluate feature distilla-
tion under following three different settings: 1). Gray-box:
We assume the adversary has full access to DNN model,
but is unaware of the input transformations applied (defense
method unaware) [11, 8]. 2). White-box: We consider ad-
versary has full access to the DNN model, as well as the
full knowledge of the defense method [3], which is more
challenging. 3). Black-box: We assume adversary does not
know the exact network architecture and weights, instead,
can use a substitute model to craft adversarial perturbations
that are transferable to the target model [11].
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Figure 4: Exploration of the defensive quantization step for a 8*8 table: (a) Defense efficiency of one pass method against
adversarial examples; (b) Defense efficiency of two pass method against adversarial examples; (c) Average defense
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(FGSM,  = 0.008); (e) Accuracy impacts of various quantization steps w.r.t. different perturbation strength (FGSM).
4.1. Experimental Setup
Our experiments are conducted on the Tensorflow DNN
computing framework [1], running with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
3.5GHz CPU and two parallel GeForce GTX 1080Ti
GPUs. Our proposed feature distillation method is imple-
mented on the heavily modified adversarial machine learn-
ing library–EvadeML-Zoo [29] for white and gray-box set-
tings and BPDA attack [3] for white box setting. To bet-
ter illustrate the image compression based mitigation, we
choose the large-scaled ImageNet dataset as our bench-
mark. Four other input-based countermeasures, including
default JPEG [9, 13], bit-depth (one of the feature squeez-
ing methods by reducing the bit number of an image pixel)
[29] and the recent proposed TV Minimization (TVM) and
Image Quilting [11] , are selected as the baselines to com-
pare with our proposed feature distillation.
Methodology. Various types of adversarial example at-
tacks, i.e., FGSM, BIM, Deepfool, CW2, CW0, CW∞ and
adaptive attack–BPDA, have been simulated in our experi-
ments for evaluating the defense. We adopt a similar evalua-
tion model from [29]. First, we choose 1000 benign images
(one per class) to evaluate the testing accuracy of each DNN
model. The seed images, which will be adding adversarial
perturbations, are selected from the first 100 correctly pre-
dicted examples in the 1000 selected images on each DNN
model for all the attack methods. The legitimate examples
classification accuracy (accl) is the testing accuracy of be-
nign images processed by the defense method. The defense
efficiency is measured by the classification accuracy (accm)
of 100 polluted images after applying the defense method.
4.2. Optimized Quantization Step
Defending against adversarial examples. Fig. 4 (a)
and (b) illustrate the impact of the quantization steps of the
8*8 table under various adversarial attacks with our one-
pass and two-pass defense approaches applied, respectively.
Apparently, both processes demonstrate that the defense ef-
ficiency can be steadily improved as the QS grows, how-
ever, it will be saturated (even decreased) if QS becomes
too large for the two pass (one pass) process. Compared
with the one pass process, the two pass process always de-
livers much better defense efficiency against most of the ad-
versarial attacks (except the CW0), due to the elimination
of the rounding error. The reason is because CW0 attacks
attempt to use a minimum number of pixel(s) with maxi-
mum perturbations to fool the DNN models, therefore the
perturbations of each single pixel will translate into larger
magnitudes than the other attacks in the frequency domain.
This leads to a much higher QS for completely removing
the associated perturbations, as Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show.
Evaluating testing accuracy. Fig. 4 (c) shows the test-
ing accuracy changes w.r.t. QSs for both malicious exam-
ples (accm) and legitimate examples (accl). The accm (1
pass) and accm (2 pass) represent the average accuracy of
various adversarial examples by applying our one pass and
two pass process, respectively. As Fig. 4 (c) shows, accm (1
pass) and accl demonstrate an opposite trend as QS grows,
but they have a cross-over zone between QS=20 and QS=40.
The adversarial perturbation dominates the accuracy reduc-
tion before the cross-over point (small QS), however, after
that, both accm (1 pass) and accl will decrease due to the
Table 1: The defense efficiency (classification accuracy on adversarial examples) of selected defense methods against
different adversarial attacks.
FGSM BIM DeepFool CW2 CW0 CWi Average accl Time (s)
No defense (%) 0 0 11 10 0 0 3.5 69.5 0.11
Bit-depth (5-bit) (%) 2 0 21 68 7 33 21.83 69.4 0.04
JPG (90) (%) 5 9 9 68 5 32 21.33 69 0.11
Quilting (%) 48 61 47 50 48 49 50.5 63.5 32.47
TVM (%) 33 42 68 77 49 90 59.8 60 38.89
FD-1P (%) 13 35 63 86 61 78 56 68.5 0.16
FD-2P (%) 92 99 99 99 58 99 91 68.5 0.16
enlarged QS. On the other hand, accm (2 pass) increases
consistently as QS increases because of additional defen-
sive quantization in compression stage. Therefore, we set
S2=20 and S1=30 for the top-n largest δ
′
i,j (AS Band) and
the others (MD Band), respectively, to better balance the
accm and accl, according to our flow in Fig. 2. Fig. 4 (d)
validates that such a configuration of (S1, S2) at n = 15
minimizes the degradation of accl (≤ 1%).
Theoretical validation of defensive QS. Fig. 4 (e) fur-
ther compare our analytic results (see Eq. 5) with ex-
perimental results for selecting QS. We use FGSM at-
tack with 5 different perturbation strengths (i.e.  =
0.005, 0.007, 0.01, 0.012, 0.015) as an example. The cor-
responding analytic QS values based on Eq. 5 should be:
20.5, 28.7, 41, 49.2 and 61.44, respectively (dash lines in
Fig. 4 (e)). As expected, those analytical values are in ex-
cellent agreement with the experimental results when the
defense efficiencies reach 100%.
4.3. Enhanced Robustness Against AE
Based on our explorations on parameters optimization in
section 4.2, we adopt S1 = 30, S2 = 20, n = 15 to evaluate
the overall defense efficiency. Note although we focus on
defense efficiency, the images compressed by our method
still provide acceptable visual quality (detailed results are
summarized in the supplemental material).
4.3.1 Gray Box Mitigation
Table. 1 compares the defense efficiency of two proposed
methods (i.e., 1-pass feature distillation FD-1P and 2-pass
version FD-2P) with five baselines–no defense, JPEG, Bit-
depth, Quilting and TVM against 6 selected adversarial ex-
amples for MobileNet. Note that JPEG (90% quality) and
Bit-depth (5-bits) are conducted under the premise of≤ 1%
legitimate classification accuracy reduction. However, the
other two methods Quilting and TVM, cannot satisfy this
constraint, so we compare our approach with those two
methods on both accl and accm.
Comparison with bit-depth and JPEG. We first limit
our comparisons to the defense with≤ 1% reduction of accl
under no defense. In this case, Quilting and TVM are not
included and will be compared separately.
Overall, FD-2P shows much better performance than that
of FD-1P (56% v.s. 91% on average). Compared with no
defense baseline, our FD-2P improves the average accuracy
on adversarial examples from ∼ 3.5% to ∼ 91%, which
demonstrates the best mitigation efficiency among all meth-
ods. Moreover, FD-2P can significantly outperform two
other defensive baselines among all selected adversarial ex-
amples, i.e. improved by ∼ 69% (or ∼ 73%) on average
than the bit-dept (5-bit) or JPEG on both DNN models.
Particularly, for L∞ attacks like FGSM, BIM and CWi,
existing model-agnostic methods show very limited effi-
ciency. Similarly, our one pass method FD-1P shows
marginal improvement when compared with the existing
approaches. However, our two pass method FD-2P can al-
most completely remove this type of L∞ perturbations and
deliver the best defense efficiency. Besides, for the L2 at-
tacks, especially CW2, existing defense methods show good
defense efficiency (∼ 68%). Again FD-2P can rectify this
kind of adversarial examples with almost 100%. Compared
with L∞ and L2, the improvement of L0 attacks (CW0)
is less significant, however, FD-2P still achieves more than
50% defense efficiency improvement comparing with bit-
depth and JPEG. That is because, JPEG (90% quality) uses
small quantization steps (or large QFs) to maintain the qual-
ity of legitimate images for desirable accuracy, however, is
also resulting in a low defense efficiency. Bit-depth roughly
quantizes all image pixels uniformly, while our method dis-
tills the features in a more fine-grained manner by maximiz-
ing the loss of adversarial perturbations and minimizing the
distortions of benign features.
Comparison with Quilting/TVM. We also compare our
solutions with Quilting and TVM in three aspects: accm,
accl, and processing-time-per-image. Our average defense
efficiency is much higher than the other two, i.e. 56%/91%
(FD-1P/FD-2P) v.s. 50.5% (quilting), 59.8% (TVM). We
also achieve the best testing accuracy (accl), that is 68.5%
(FD-1P/2P) v.s. 63.5% (quilting), 60% (TVM). Moreover,
we improve the processing-time-per-image (i.e., 0.15s on
FD-1P) by ∼ 216× (∼ 259×) compared with Quilting
(32.4s) and TVM (38.8s), or 0.15s (FD-1P) v.s. 32.4s (quilt-
ing) and 38.8s (TVM), as Table 1 shows.
In general, our proposed feature distillation is particu-
Table 2: The defense efficiency (accuracy on adversarial examples–accm and accuracy on legitimate images–accl on
ImageNet, against adaptive adversarial attack–BPDA.
None Bit-depth Quilting TVM JPEG(75) JPEG(20) JPEG(10) FD(1x) FD(2x) FD(3x)
accm (%) 0 0 0 0 0 34 45 10 42 60
accl (%) 78 77 72 68 74 68 61 77 76 74
larly effective to mitigate stronger attacks (i.e. CW attacks
with least perturbations but ∼ 100% attack success rate)
crafted from complex datasets like ImageNet. Our solu-
tion demonstrates great potentials to safeguard the DNNs
against adversarial attacks in practical applications, given
that it is likely the attackers prefer to generate stronger ad-
versarial examples with minimum adversarial perturbations
from realistic large-scale dataset so as to evade any possible
defense methods.
4.3.2 White Box Mitigation
In this section, we evaluate our method against recent
BPDA attack, of which adversary knows the defense
method and iteratively generates adversarial examples ac-
cording to the defense. We implement our defense–Feature
Distillation (FD-1P) in the released BPDA attack [3] code
at GitHub, using the same Inception v3 model and 100 it-
erations for BPDA. The accuracy of benign examples (ad-
versarial examples) after defense-accl (accm), for different
methods are reported in Table 2.
First, Bit-depth, quilting and TVM does not offer any
defense against BPDA, as expected. Second, JPEG can
slightly mitigate BPDA by degrading image quality, i.e.
quality factor from 75 to 10, defense efficiency (accm) is
improved from 0 to 45%. This is consistent with the recent
result [21]. However, accl drops by 17% compared to base-
line (61% v.s. 78%), which is unacceptable. This reason is
because in order to eliminate a large perturbation of BPDA
attack in the lowest frequency component in JPEG, a sig-
nificant large quantization factor (QF) will be needed. As a
result, large quantization errors will occur in high frequency
components, thereby significantly hurting accl. Third, On
the other hand, our solution can provide the best defense ef-
ficiency against BPDA with least accl reduction among all
solutions, i.e. from FD (1X) to FD (3X), accm is improved
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Figure 5: Defense efficiency of black-box setting for different
attack and defense mechanisms on ImageNet.
from 10% to 60%, with merely 1%-3% accl reduction com-
pared to original 78%. FD-1×, 2×, 3× represent the quan-
tization step (QS) of FD adopted in Table. 1 (reference), 2
times and 3 times of the referred QS, respectively.
4.3.3 Black Box Mitigation
We follow the work [11] for black-box analysis: DNN
model used for testing is trained on transformed dataset
(Feature Distillation), while attackers generate adversarial
examples from the model trained on the original dataset.
The crafted examples have high transferability between the
two models for fair black-box analysis. We adopt Mo-
bileNet and the results of our methods are shown in Fig. 5.
The average defense efficiency is improved from
56%/91% (Table 1) to 81%/99% (black-box) for our FD-
1P/FD-2P method, respectively. These results indicate that
our method defends against black-box setting efficiently.
This is also consistent with the following conclusion based
on [3, 11]: Black box setting shows weak attack efficiency
against the input-transformation based defenses.
5. Conclusion
As the robustness of DNN is significantly challenged
by a variety of adversarial attacks, existing studies inves-
tigate the standard JPEG compression as a defense method,
however, it is far from satisfactory in terms of both de-
fense efficiency and testing accuracy. In this work, we pro-
pose the DNN-favorable feature distillation method by re-
architecting the JPEG compression framework. Compared
with existing model-agnostic defense approaches, our “fea-
ture distillation” can simultaneously reduce the adversarial
attack success rate and maximize the testing accuracy on
legitimate examples. Experimental results show that our
method can improve the defense efficiency from ∼ 20% to
∼ 90% over most recent model-agnostic approaches with
only marginal accuracy degradation (≤ 1%), while signif-
icantly improving the processing time per image (∼ 260×
speedup). Our method also demonstrates the best defense
efficiency against latest adaptive attack–BPDA (∼ 60%)
with least accuracy drop (∼ 1%) when compared with other
input-transformation based defenses.
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